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MISSING LINKS IN THE PRESIDENT’S
EVOLUTION ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash*
INTRODUCTION
Pity the constitutional law professor turned President. We expect a level
of incoherence and confusion from Presidents who are untutored in the
Constitution’s mysteries. Constitutional law can be baffling with its layers
of vague text, uncertain structure, contested history, and mystifying judicial
doctrines. Yet when a President has not only studied the subject but also
taught constitutional law in a former life,1 many demand more of that
President.
President Barack Obama has dashed such expectations, at least when it
comes to his evolution on same-sex marriage. Fine-tunes and shifts in
constitutional thought are appropriate, particularly for espousers of an
evolving Constitution. But the President’s public evolution has a few
missing links, places where he shrinks from the implications of his legal
arguments on the constitutional status of homosexuals.
Like all evolutions, the President’s has gone through several stages.
After entering office, he continued his predecessor’s practice of enforcing
and defending the Defense of Marriage Act2 (DOMA), even as he sought its
repeal.3 Enforcing the Act required his administration to read federal
statutory references to marriage as excluding same-sex married couples.
Defending it entailed arguing that the Act was constitutional when plaintiffs
asserted otherwise in court.
In early 2011, the President underwent a metamorphosis. In his February
letter to the Speaker of the House, Attorney General Eric Holder reported

* David Lurton Massee, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
Thanks to John Harrison, Caleb Nelson, Steve Walt, and Erin Ward for rather helpful
comments and discussions. Thanks also to UVA’s Refdesk and Erin Ward for research
assistance. Finally, thanks to the University of Virginia for summer research support.
1. See Jodi Kantor, Teaching Law, Testing Ideas, Obama Stood Slightly Apart, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2008, at A1 (noting that Obama taught a class on equal protection and due
process).
2. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
3. Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the Smelt v. United
States Brief (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.indianaequality.org/2009/08/17/
presidential-statement-on-doma/.
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that the President had judged DOMA to be unconstitutional.4 First, the
President concluded that DOMA should be subject to heightened
(intermediate) scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment.5 Second, he determined that the statute’s failure to recognize
same-sex marriages was indefensible under this heightened standard,
because no important justification supported DOMA’s refusal to recognize
such marriages.6 In fact, the Administration concluded that DOMA’s
legislative history suggested that federal legislators sought to harm a
politically unpopular group, an impermissible motive under equal
protection jurisprudence.7 In sum, the Obama Administration deemed
DOMA unconstitutional due to its impermissible and unimportant
justification for its bar on federal recognition of same-sex marriages.8
In May of 2012, the President had another transformation. He now
favored same-sex marriage, a policy he had not previously expressed either
as a presidential candidate or as President.9 However, in reiterating his
opposition to a federal constitutional amendment banning same-sex
marriage, he insisted that the issue should be decided on a state-by-state
basis and not be “federalized.”10 He also rejected the suggestion that he
ought to direct the Department of Justice (DOJ) to file briefs against state
anti-same-sex marriage laws: “[T]his is an issue that is gonna be worked
out at the local level, because historically, this has not been a federal issue
. . . .”11 Further, the President explained: “I think it is a mistake to—try to
make what has traditionally been a state issue into a national issue.”12 He

4. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House
of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Holder Letter], available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (discussing litigation involving
the Defense of Marriage Act).
5. See id. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the
Fifth Amendment’s due process clause had an equal protection component that applied to
federal laws and actions. Id. at 500. After some early decisions to the contrary, modern case
law has made clear that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment has the
same contours as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Adarand v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995) (declaring that equal protection analysis is the same in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment contexts).
6. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. The President may have favored gay marriage as a policy matter as a candidate for
state office in Illinois. See Charles Krauthammer, Obama’s Same-Sex Marriage
Contradiction, NAT’L REV. (May 17, 2012, 8:00 PM), www.nationalreview.com/articles/
300338/obama-s-same-sex-marriage-contradiction-charles-krauthammer.
10. Transcript: Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President Obama, ABC NEWS
(May 9, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-robin-roberts-abc-news-interviewwith-President-obama/story?id=16316043#.UEy_laPUSuk (interview transcript).
11. Id.; see also Lyle Denniston, Obama on Gay Marriage: The Fine Print,
SCOTUSBLOG (May 10, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/05/obama-ongay-marriage-the-fine-print.
12. Transcript: Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President Obama, supra note
10.
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evidently favored local decisions about whether to recognize same-sex
marriages.
The President is correct that marriage historically has been the province
of the states.13 But that fact hardly insulates state marriage laws from equal
protection challenges, as Loving v. Virginia14 makes clear.15 And that
makes sense, for the Fourteenth Amendment reaches all state laws,
regardless of their subject matters.16 Specifically, modern judicial doctrine
“federalize[s]” and makes “a national issue” of the question of same-sex
marriage, at least insofar as it subjects all state laws to some level of equal
protection scrutiny.17
This fact about modern constitutional doctrine leaves the constitutional
law professor-turned-President on the horns of a dilemma. He cannot
simultaneously conclude that DOMA is unconstitutional under existing
equal protection doctrine and yet also imagine that the states may
constitutionally refuse to permit or recognize same-sex marriage. If federal
laws should be subject to heightened scrutiny when they treat same-sex
marriage differently from heterosexual marriage, then so must state laws
that deny recognition for, or bar, same-sex marriages. Moreover, it is
almost certain that the heightened scrutiny the President favors would lead
to the wholesale invalidation of those state laws. In other words, the
Obama Administration’s argument against DOMA, if applied to state laws,
should generate nationwide uniformity. Each and every state will have to
recognize same-sex marriages, at least so long as they recognize oppositesex marriages.
One suspects that President Obama’s divergent stances do not reflect a
failure to grasp either equal protection doctrine or his argument’s
implications for state laws. He and his lawyers are too smart. His
incompatible stances more likely result from political calculation, the kind
all Presidents engage in, even ones who formerly taught constitutional law.
The President wants federal statutes to treat gay married couples as they
treat heterosexual married couples. He partly accomplishes that goal by
failing to defend section 3 of DOMA and by explaining to the courts why
he believes it to be unconstitutional, with the hope that the courts will agree
and relieve him of any obligation to abide by DOMA. But the President
does not want to declare that he believes all state laws banning same-sex
marriage are unconstitutional, because he is unprepared to take that bolder
stance. That particular evolution will have to wait for a more politically
expeditious moment. The President’s peculiar posture allows him to make
a constitutional argument against DOMA, express a personal preference in
13. See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (declaring that
“[i]nsofar as marriage is within temporal control, the States lay on the guiding hand”).
14. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
15. Id.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
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favor of same-sex marriage, and yet still permit state diversity on same-sex
marriage. His justifications for these incongruous stances are not as
edifying as his constitutional law classes at the University of Chicago must
have been.
The President’s constitutional contortions cast doubt on the wisdom of a
scheme where the Chief Executive may make independent constitutional
determinations and act upon them, including declining to defend the
constitutionality of certain federal laws. If the President can raise
constitutional concerns at times and then ignore them as it suits him, it
raises misgivings about his role as a constitutional guardian. He becomes
less someone who can be expected to “preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution”18 and more an opportunistic pol who uses constitutional
arguments in insincere ways to advance an electoral agenda.
However much this critique may be true as applied to President Obama
and same-sex marriage, one should not expect perfection from Presidents.
Chief Executives, because they are human, always can be expected to
advance legal arguments in an opportunistic way. Of course, they are no
worse than any other institution. The Supreme Court got Marbury v.
Madison19 and Dred Scott v. Sandford20 wrong in multiple ways.
Moreover, federal courts occasionally issue opinions that are inconsistent
with existing case law.21 Finally, judges are hardly above using the
Constitution to advance their personal preferences in insincere and
inconsistent ways. Most do not condemn judges as legal interpreters
merely because judges occasionally act inconsistently or insincerely. If the
President, as constitutional defender, is occasionally unprincipled or
inconsistent, he has the best of company. This is not to excuse the
President’s same-sex marriage contortions. It is only meant to suggest that
when it comes to constitutional interpretation, each of us lives in a glass
house.
However imperfect any particular President might be, the institutional
design question is whether the system of constitutional defense works best
with the presidency actively defending the Constitution. If the system is
better with active presidential involvement, as a supplement to judicial
review and other protective mechanisms, it does not matter much that
presidential defense measures, by themselves, are imperfect. In other
words, even as we lament a President’s sacrifice of constitutional principle
at the altar of political expediency, we may have reason to endorse a system
where the President serves as a constitutional protector.

18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
19. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
20. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
21. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 947, 951–55 (2008) (documenting cases where the Supreme Court has
explicitly and implicitly jettisoned precedent).
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I. OBAMA, DOMA, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
As noted, after entering office, the President decided that while he would
seek the repeal of DOMA, he would continue to enforce and defend it.22
This meant that his administration would interpret federal law references to
marriage as including only marriages between a man and a woman. In
practice, this policy ensured that whatever benefits and burdens federal law
assigned to married individuals went to opposite-sex married couples only.
Furthermore, whenever plaintiffs argued that DOMA was unconstitutional,
the Administration would defend its constitutionality on both equal
protection and substantive due process grounds.
That approach changed in February 2011, when the Attorney General and
the President concluded that DOMA was unconstitutional because it
discriminated against homosexuals.23 Implicit in the Attorney General’s
letter to the Speaker of the House was the (widely-held) assumption that
DOMA contains a sexual orientation classification. Holder must have
thought that because DOMA defends traditional, opposite-sex marriage by
denying federal recognition to same-sex marriages, it classifies on the basis
of sexual orientation.24
Having asserted that DOMA contains a sexual orientation classification,
the Attorney General argued that heightened scrutiny ought to apply.25
Heightened scrutiny was appropriate, said Holder, because of the history of
discrimination against homosexuals and their status as a discrete, politically

22. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
23. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4.
24. In fact, DOMA contains no express sexual orientation classification. DOMA does
not say that the federal government will not recognize marriages entered into by
homosexuals. Nor does it single out homosexuals and only deny them recognition of their
same-sex marriages. Rather, homosexuals who marry, no less than heterosexuals who do,
are considered married under federal law, so long as they are married to someone of the
opposite sex. Indeed, some have argued that DOMA does not facially discriminate against
homosexuals but instead facially discriminates on the basis of gender. Males can only marry
females and females can only marry males, and in this way each sex faces different legal
constraints. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and
Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).
But even as DOMA lacks a facial sexual orientation classification, it excludes the
very type of marriage that gays are far more likely to consummate (same-sex marriage). So
even though heterosexuals theoretically might choose to marry someone of the same sex in
states that permit same-sex marriage (perhaps to obtain the beneficial treatment accorded to
married individuals) and thus be negatively impacted by DOMA, homosexuals appear the
targets of DOMA in purpose and effect. Put another way, despite its lack of an explicit
sexual orientation classification, DOMA implicitly targets homosexuals, who are far more
likely to enter into a same-sex marriage.
Neither the Attorney General’s letter nor the DOJ’s filings in court acknowledge the
more complicated relationship between DOMA and sexual orientation or what that might
mean for its constitutionality. Instead, both assume that DOMA contains a sexual
orientation classification. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4; see also infra note 31.
25. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4.
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weak section of society.26 The application of heightened scrutiny meant
that federal classifications based on sexual orientation must be
“substantially related to an important government objective.”27 Moreover,
the objective must be one that actually motivated the entity making the
classification.28
Applying these tests, the Attorney General concluded that the actual
legislative justifications for DOMA were unimportant and thus failed to
satisfy the standard.29 He claimed that the congressional debate contained
“numerous expressions reflecting moral disapproval of gays and lesbians
and their intimate and family relationships–precisely the kind of stereotypebased thinking and animus the Equal Protection Clause is designed to guard
against.”30 In other words, Attorney General Holder believed that the
governmental objective was moral disapproval, an unimportant objective.31
Hence DOMA was unconstitutional, at least under heightened scrutiny.
That was the sum and substance of the letter’s legal analysis. Its more
practical facet was its announcement that the Administration would not
defend DOMA.32 Notwithstanding that decision, the Administration would
26. The Attorney General never discussed why strict scrutiny was not the correct
standard. Instead, he merely asserted that the more forgiving intermediate scrutiny was
proper. See id.
27. Id. (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. Id.
31. In its briefs, the DOJ also has argued that even if DOMA’s objectives are important,
DOMA does not substantially advance them. See Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief
for the Federal Defendants at 9–13, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2011). See generally Federal Defendants’
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Notice of Cross Motion and Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment, Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 4:10-CV01564 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); Response of Defendants United States of America and Eric
H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor BLAG’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment., Bishop v.
United States, No. 4:04-CV-00848-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2011).
32. In fact, the Administration’s legal posture was more complicated. The President had
determined that DOMA was unconstitutional under heightened scrutiny. Going forward, the
Administration would argue that such scrutiny was appropriate. But where courts had
already determined that DOMA was subject to rational basis review, the Administration
would continue to defend DOMA because of its view that DOMA satisfied rational basis
review. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4. In turn, the Administration’s actual stance
was to defend DOMA in those circuits that previously had held that homosexual
classifications were only subject to rational basis review.
In other circuits, the
Administration would argue that heightened scrutiny was appropriate and attack DOMA as
unconstitutional for failure to satisfy that scrutiny. This stance reflected a misguided faith in
the Duty to Defend. Quite rightly, the Obama Administration abandoned this strange stance
before the First Circuit in April of 2012. The Administration said it would no longer defend
DOMA under any standard of review. See Chris Geidner, Federal Appeals Judges Consider
Whether DOMA Is Constitutional in Historic Hearing in Boston, METROWEEKLY (Apr. 4,
2012, 2:30 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2012/04/federal-appeals-judgesconsider-whether-doma-is.html. The First Circuit later struck down DOMA under a rational
basis with bite approach. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682
F.3d 1, 16–17 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Joe Palazzolo, First Circuit Shoots Down DOMA,
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still continue to enforce DOMA, thereby guaranteeing a live controversy to
ensure that the courts (rather than the President) would be the final arbiters
of its constitutionality.33 To assist the courts in this task, the executive
branch would file briefs explaining why DOMA was unconstitutional.34
Congress, if it chose, could appoint its own counsel to defend DOMA’s
constitutionality.35
In a 2012 letter to the Speaker of the House, the Attorney General
extended his constitutional argument to other federal laws.36 Discussing the
case filed by current and former members of the Armed Forces,
McLaughlin v. Panetta,37 the Attorney General declared that Title 38’s
definitional provisions,38 insofar as they affect same-sex couples, are
unconstitutional as well.39 Those provisions, like DOMA, define “spouse”
as a “person of the opposite sex,” thereby excluding same-sex married
couples from the veterans’ benefits dispensed under Title 38.40 Holder
argued that the exclusion of same-sex married couples “cannot survive
heightened scrutiny because [the exclusions] are not ‘substantially related to
an important governmental objective.’”41 The justifications “must describe
actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently
grounded.”42 He quickly concluded, without elaboration, that the actual
legislative record “contains no rationale for” excluding same-sex spouses
from veterans’ benefits.43 Further, neither the Department of Defense nor
the Department of Veterans Affairs could justify Title 38’s same-sex
marriage exclusion.44
The second Holder letter makes clear that DOMA was not uniquely
problematic.45 Unlike DOMA, Title 38’s opposite-sex definitions of
spouse46 were enacted in an era when there was no animus towards samesex marriage. In this case, the opposite-sex definition modified a genderWSJ L. BLOG (May 31, 2012, 11:37 AM), blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/05/31/first-circuit-shootsdown-doma.
33. 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House
of Representatives (Feb. 17, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Holder Letter], available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/boehner02-17-12.pdf (discussing litigation involving the Defense
of Marriage Act).
37. No. 11-11905 (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2011).
38. 38 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
39. See 2012 Holder Letter, supra note 36.
40. § 101(3), (31).
41. 2012 Holder Letter, supra note 36.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. As with DOMA, Title 38 lacks a facial sexual orientation classification. Again,
anyone who marries someone of the opposite sex is considered married under Title 38,
whether heterosexual or not. Nonetheless, its effect is disproportionally felt by homosexuals
who are far more likely to want to enter into a same-sex marriage.
45. See id.
46. See 38 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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specific statute that assumed that only females would collect benefits as a
result of being married to male spouses in the military. The provision was
meant to eliminate an assumption that men would not be married to female
soldiers and sailors.47 Legislation cannot be motivated by animus against a
practice if the practice is relatively unknown or, as of yet, relatively
inconceivable. There likely was no thought to the resulting exclusion of
same-sex marriages because few had conceived of the possibility in 1975.48
Yet because Holder had concluded that sexual orientation classifications
were entitled to heightened scrutiny, no matter their provenance, what
mattered to Holder was whether there was an important governmental
purpose behind the supposed classification. Of course, there could be no
such purpose when those who enacted the relevant sections in Title 38
likely did not fathom the possibility of same-sex marriage. Ironically, the
fact that Title 38’s definitional sections were enacted in an era oblivious to
questions of same-sex marriage made those sections more susceptible to
invalidation, at least under the Attorney General’s argument.49
The two Holder letters are exclusively about the equal protection
doctrine. Neither asserted that DOMA is unconstitutional on the grounds
that individuals have a constitutional right, via substantive due process, to
marry someone of the same sex. In briefs filed before courts, the
Administration has rejected substantive due process claims against
DOMA.50 The Administration has avoided saying whether there is a
47. S. REP. NO. 94-568, at 1, 19–20 (1975).
48. At least one set of plaintiffs had sought a right to marry someone of the same sex.
See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). The case was dismissed for lack of a substantial
federal question, a disposition that suggests that few thought the claims had any legal merit.
Michael C. Dorf and Sidney Tarrow claim that the issue was off the radar screen through the
1980s. See Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, How the Right Helped Launch Same-Sex
Marriage Movement, CNN OPINION (May 14, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2012/05/14/opinion/dorf-tarrow-same-sex-marriage/index.html.
49. In the February 2012 letter, the Obama Administration implicitly concluded that
heightened scrutiny applies to suspect classifications even when legislators were almost
certainly unaware that their law contained the classification in question. To my knowledge,
the Supreme Court has never confronted the question, much less held that unconscious
classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny. The absence of relevant doctrine
suggests the possibility that Title 38 should not be subject to heightened scrutiny. Instead,
one might suppose that laws classifying people via a trait that normally triggers heightened
scrutiny should receive rational basis instead when those laws hail from an era where people
would not have understood the underlying laws as containing any such classification. While
this approach has its merits, I doubt that the Obama Administration will be moved to modify
its approach. If one supposes that the Obama Administration seeks to break down barriers to
the recognition of same-sex marriage, then it will disfavor any argument that suggests that
rational basis review applies to such laws. Moreover, the Obama Administration’s case for
heightened scrutiny arguably rests at least in part on the desire to protect a certain class,
regardless of the motivations or awareness of the legislature. In other words, that legislators
or voters were unaware that they were denying benefits to a particular group may be thought
irrelevant.
50. See Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief for the Federal Defendants at 9–13,
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214
(1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2011); Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
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constitutional right to marry or whether, if there is such a right, it applies to
people who wish to marry someone of the same-sex. Instead, it has argued
that even if there is a substantive due process right to marry, there is no
substantive due process right to government subsidies for the married.51
As it stands now, the Obama Administration’s litigation strategy has the
political virtue of pushing for the judicial nullification of DOMA without
also declaring that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right. It also has
the advantage of saying nothing about the constitutionality of state laws that
limit marriage to heterosexual couples. At a time where there are some
thirty states that have passed anti-same-sex marriage laws, silence on the
issue may prove golden.52 The President, with the help of his Attorney
General, seems to have threaded the needle.
II. OBAMA, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, AND THE STATES
Yet cool politicians who thread political needles can expect to be
criticized by the ardent. Same-sex marriage supporters believed that the
President went far, but not far enough. When he came out in favor of samesex marriages in his May 2012 interview with ABC’s Robin Roberts,53 the
President also ought to have declared that same-sex marriage was a civil
right, said these gentle critics. Because same-sex marriage is a civil right, it
is not a matter to be left to the states, like whether to have a state income tax
or what the state’s motto ought to be. Critics of the President on the right,
including some supporters of same-sex marriage, chastised his supposed
inconsistency.54 If DOMA is unconstitutional because homosexuals have a
right to marry, then all state laws forbidding same-sex marriage or refusing
to recognize such marriages must be unconstitutional as well, they argued.
Both sets of critics misread the President. While supporters of same-sex
marriage may believe that there is a constitutional right to such marriages,
Judgment; Notice of Cross Motion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Dragovich v.
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 4:10-CV-01564 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); Response of
Defendants United States of America and Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor BLAG’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment., Bishop v. United States, No. 4:04-CV-00848-TCK-TLW
(N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2011).
51. See Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief for the Federal Defendants at 9–13,
Massachusetts, Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214; Federal Defendants’ Opposition to
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Notice of Cross Motion and Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment, Dragovich, No. 4:10-CV-01564; Response of Defendants United States
of America and Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor BLAG’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment., Bishop, No. 4:04-CV-00848-TCK-TLW.
52. North Carolina Passes Same-Sex Marriage Ban, CNN Projects, CNN (May 11,
2012, 11:04 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/08/politics/north-carolina-marriage/
index.html. Thirty-one states, including North Carolina, have voted for constitutional
amendments banning same-sex marriage.
53. Transcript: Robin Roberts ABC News Interview with President Obama, supra note
10.
54. See Krauthammer, supra note 9; Jacob Sullum, Obama’s Gay Marriage
Contradiction, REASON.COM (June 13, 2012), http://reason.com/archives/2012/06/13/
obamas-gay-marriage-contradiction.
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the President never claimed as much. In his May interview, he expressed a
policy preference of the sort that has no constitutional implications.55 Just
as a member of Congress may favor a balanced budget without believing
that deficit spending is unconstitutional, so too may a President support
same-sex marriage without simultaneously reading the Constitution as
containing a right to same-sex marriage.
For much the same reason, some critics on the right also misconstrued
the President. Again, the President has never said that federal law must
recognize same-sex marriages. Rather, the President has concluded that
under equal protection doctrine, federal law cannot distinguish between
same-sex and opposite-sex marriages absent some important governmental
justification.
If federal statutes never contained marriage-based
classifications, there obviously could be no argument against those laws on
the grounds that they unconstitutionally distinguished some marriages from
others. Further, nothing in equal protection doctrine requires federal law to
benefit marriages as opposed to other relationships, like neighbors or
business partners.
Having said all this, the President’s arguments that DOMA violates the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment have unmistakable
implications for existing state laws. First, the Holder letters declare that
gays and lesbians are entitled to heightened scrutiny,56 a standard that
would necessarily apply to state laws distributing benefits and burdens in a
manner that excludes gays. Second, the application of heightened scrutiny
means that any state statute that draws a distinction on the basis of sexual
orientation must be justified by an important governmental interest.57
Third, that interest must be the one that actually motivated the relevant
lawmakers, not a post hoc justification. Fourth, the presence of arguments
in the legislative history about the immorality of gay sex or same-sex
marriage will tend to make it difficult, if not impossible, to claim that denial
of a same-sex marriage right was motivated by an important governmental
interest. Finally, any law supposedly supported by an important interest
must also substantially advance that interest. If we apply the standards
advanced in the 2011 and 2012 Holder letters (i.e., the five factors above) as
Holder applied them, states that fail to permit same-sex marriage or fail to
recognize such marriages have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
To be sure, there are differences between DOMA and the state anti-samesex marriage laws. Significantly, the latter typically regulate who may get
married, while the former says nothing about that subject. Because states
have long regulated who may get married and which marriages they will
recognize, the states might be thought to have a stronger interest in barring
55. See generally Transcript: Robin Roberts ABC News Interview With President
Obama, supra note 10.
56. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4; 2012 Holder Letter, supra note 36.
57. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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same-sex marriages than the federal government does in not recognizing
them. Further, state laws regulating same-sex marriages may appear more
likely to further whatever interests the states are said to be pursuing because
states are directly regulating same-sex marriage, while the federal
government is merely influencing such marriages indirectly, via its decision
not to recognize such marriages.58 Still, these differences will not matter.
More precisely, under the standards announced in the Holder letter and in
DOJ DOMA filings, these considerations will be irrelevant.
To see why the President’s anti-DOMA argument spells doom for state
anti-same-sex marriages laws, we must focus on state laws. It will prove
helpful to divide all state laws, both statutes and constitutional amendments,
into two categories. The first set consists of laws enacted when same-sex
marriage was very much in the minds of legislators and voters. For lack of
a better phrase, call this the “Conscious Era” because state legislators would
have discussed (or at least been aware of) the issue of same-sex marriage as
they tinkered with their marriage laws. In contrast, the previous period
reflects an obliviousness of the possibility of same-sex marriage, because
the prospect was unknown or so obscure that state legislators would never
have thought of the idea as they passed marriage laws. Call this the
“Oblivious Era.”
When the Conscious Era began (and thus when the Oblivious Era ended)
is uncertain. The Conscious Era likely began after 1993, when Hawaii’s
Supreme Court concluded that barring same-sex marriage might violate the
state’s equal protection clause.59 It certainly began well after 1972, when
the Supreme Court dismissed a federal appeal seeking a right to same-sex
marriage by declaring that the case failed to present a substantial federal
question.60 If the Supreme Court could dismiss the case so curtly, it
suggests that the claims were far outside the era’s legal mainstream. Those
versed in the political history of same-sex marriage can better speculate

58. The Obama Administration believes that federal laws that refuse to recognize samesex marriages do not substantially advance any governmental interest because such laws do
not directly regulate the underlying marriage relationship. See, e.g., Combined Reply Brief
and Response Brief for the Federal Defendants at 9–13, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2011); Federal
Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Notice of Cross
Motion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
No. 4:10-CV-01564 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); Response of Defendants United States of
America and Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor BLAG’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment., Bishop v. United States, No. 4:04-CV-00848-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. Nov. 18,
2011). This logic suggests that the Obama Administration might believe that state antisame-sex marriage laws are more likely to directly and substantially further state interests,
whatever they may be. The difference is one of degree, with federal influence on marriage
being more attenuated and the state regulation being more direct and therefore more likely
substantial.
59. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993).
60. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972).
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when the Conscious Era began.61 What is clear, however, is that the
Oblivious Era covers most of our nation’s history.
Many, if not all, state laws from the Conscious Era were likely motivated
by the same concerns that propelled DOMA—a desire to endorse traditional
marriage and discourage homosexuality.
If these concerns were
impermissible at the federal level, as Attorney General Holder argued,62
those interests are equally so in the states. Indeed, in the course of using the
lowest standard of review, the Supreme Court has said such justifications
are inadequate for state constitutional provisions that make it more difficult
for supporters of gay rights to enact localized protections for gays and
lesbians.63 If one applies heightened scrutiny, it almost certainly means that
state laws from the Conscious Era that discriminate against same-sex
marriages are unconstitutional.
Theoretically, it is possible for a law to be upheld even if one
justification is impermissible, so long as one of its other justifications meets
the applicable standard. In its DOMA filings, the DOJ highlights the
impermissible motivations before going on to consider whether there
nevertheless was an important public interest motivating federal legislators.
The secondary inquiry would have been pointless if the mere presence of
animus necessarily invalidated otherwise acceptable motivations.64
The theoretical possibility that acceptable motivations will overcome a
finding of animus proves elusive in practice. When applying a form of
heightened scrutiny, the discovery of an improper purpose arouses the
suspicion that it was likely the dominant, if not sole, objective and that this
actual and forbidden motive ought to trump all else. Justice Kennedy’s
Romer v. Evans65 opinion illustrates this tendency, to an extreme. Applying
rational basis review, that opinion failed to credit Colorado’s otherwise
legitimate purposes for instituting a ban on state or local antidiscrimination
provisions benefiting homosexuals.66 Colorado claimed the amendment
conserved antidiscrimination resources for other classes of persons and
fostered freedom of association.67 Justice Kennedy said that these purposes
could not be credited because the amendment was so broad.68 But the
breadth of the amendment was irrelevant to the question of whether the
interests identified were legitimate. At most, amendment 2’s breadth was

61. See, e.g., Dorf & Tarrow, supra note 48.
62. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4.
63. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–35 (1996).
64. Justice Kennedy’s Romer v. Evans opinion applies rational basis review to
Colorado’s Amendment 2, despite first identifying animus as a possible motivation before
considering other purposes that would have been legitimate had they been creditable. See
517 U.S. at 632–35.
65. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
66. See id. at 634–35.
67. See id. at 635.
68. See id.
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germane to whether the amendment was rationally related to the interests
Colorado identified.
Counterfactually, had the Court believed that the pool of Colorado voters
was dominated by libertarians bent on fostering the freedom of association
or by groups seeking to conserve scarce antidiscrimination resources,
perhaps there would have been no animus found and the Court would have
upheld the law. But because the majority identified animus as an actual
motivating factor, other legitimate potential bases were crowded out and
belittled. Because the Court essentially ignored legitimate governmental
interests in a case subject only to rational basis review, it seems quite likely
that the Court also would give short shrift to legitimate governmental
interests in a case where heightened scrutiny applies. That is to say, the
conclusion that there is animosity lurking behind a law often will
overwhelm and render irrelevant the presence of legitimate interests.69
Still, it is worth considering the possible interests that might be sufficient
to justify upholding state laws prohibiting same-sex marriages. In the
context of DOMA, the DOJ has not explicitly declared that defending
traditional marriage and promoting responsible procreation and child
rearing are impermissible or unimportant interests. Because of this
ambiguity, we cannot say for certain that the Administration would reject
these interests in the context of challenges to state laws that ban, or refuse
to recognize, same-sex marriages.70
But the Obama Administration’s discussion of whether DOMA is
substantially related to those interests does shed light on what its position
ought to be on the same question vis-à-vis state laws. The DOJ claimed
that DOMA was not substantially related to the defense of traditional
marriage because DOMA neither prevented same-sex marriages nor denied
them legal protection.71
In the case of state laws banning same-sex marriage or refusing to
recognize that institution, they too seem unrelated to defending traditional
marriage, albeit for different reasons. State laws banning, or refusing to
69. While the Court has declared that a law may be upheld even when there are
improper motivations behind it (because the law would have been enacted anyway for
entirely appropriate reasons), see Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977), the Court apparently has yet to uphold such a law in practice.
70. To judge the constitutionality of state anti-same-sex marriage laws under heightened
scrutiny, a court would have to examine the actual motivations of state legislators. Because I
do not wish to canvas these actual interests across dozens of laws, I use the federal interests
at issue in DOMA on the assumption that the interests are largely the same.
71. See generally Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief for the Federal Defendants
at 9–13, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207,
10-2214 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2011); Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Notice of Cross Motion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment,
Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 4:10-CV-01564 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012);
Response of Defendants United States of America and Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor
BLAG’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment., Bishop v. United States, No. 4:04-CV00848-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2011).
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recognize, same-sex marriage do nothing to shore up traditional marriage.
In particular, they do not make such marriages more stable or more
meaningful, as marriage counseling or a subsidy might. Instead, state antisame-sex marriage laws merely deny legal recognition to those who
consummate such marriages. Given the President’s position on DOMA, he
likely will not conclude that state anti-same-sex marriage laws are
substantially related to a defense of traditional marriage. Rather, he likely
would find the two largely unrelated, in the same way that the failure to
allocate funds towards shoring up the Brooklyn Bridge would not, by itself,
buttress the Lincoln Tunnel.
To be sure, anti-same-sex marriage laws do have the effect of defending
the traditional conception of marriage, but that is but a defense of a
definition. If anti-same-sex marriage laws merely defend the traditional
sense of the word “marriage,” as opposed to the marriages that exist in the
real world, that hardly seems consequential. Indeed, one might say that
defending the traditional denotation of a word or phrase is never important.
In any event, the Obama Administration almost certainly does not believe
that defending the traditional sense of an institution is a substantial interest.
So the Obama Administration might concede that defending actual
marriage of the traditional sort is an important interest. But it is quite likely
to insist that state anti-same-sex marriage laws do not substantially advance
that interest but instead deny equal protection to those who seek state
recognition of their same-sex marriages.
Anti-same-sex marriage laws do not substantially advance responsible
procreation and childrearing justifications either.
No state limits
procreation to heterosexuals, much less married heterosexuals.
Homosexuals may continue to procreate, via sperm or egg donations,
whether or not states ban same-sex marriages. Anti-same-sex marriage
laws only affect decisions to procreate at the margin, when a homosexual
decides not to procreate because he or she cannot marry another
homosexual. This means that anti-same-sex marriage laws do not
substantially advance responsible procreation.
Similarly, homosexuals can continue to rear children, whether or not the
states recognize same-sex marriages. Homosexual childrearing is unlikely
to decrease in any substantial way merely because states refuse to recognize
or permit same-sex marriage. Moreover, with respect to childrearing, the
DOJ has rejected the notion that gays and lesbians cannot be, or are less
likely to be, responsible parents.72 Again, while responsible childrearing
may be an important governmental interest, the Obama Administration will
deny that anti-same-sex marriage laws substantially advance that interest.

72. See Superseding Brief for the United States Department of Health & Human
Services, et al. at 49–51, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 10-2204 (D. Mass. Sept. 22,
2011).
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In sum, the state laws passed during the Conscious Era are likely to have
the same flaws that the DOJ has identified in DOMA. First, they are
presumably motivated, at least in part, by moral disapproval or a bare desire
to harm an unpopular group, neither of which constitute “important
governmental interests.” Second, alternative justifications will likely either
fail that standard or be insufficiently related to the state law, and thus not
“substantially related” to the important governmental purpose.
Of course, not all state laws that plaintiffs will challenge are from the
Conscious Era. Some were passed during the Oblivious Era. As noted, this
second category of state laws reflects ignorance of the possibility of samesex marriage (rather than disapproval of it) because these laws were passed
before people had conceived of that possibility. During this period, it
would not have occurred to legislators that limiting marriage to opposite sex
couples might constrain anyone, except those who wished to have a plural
marriage. More precisely, most state legislators would not have been aware
that there were people (constituents, friends, or relatives) who wished to
marry someone of the same sex. Steeped in conventional sexual mores, the
idea of same-sex marriage did not exist in the minds of those legislators.73
The Oblivious Era covers much of the nation’s history and has an uncertain
terminus because it is hard to identify precisely when an issue becomes
sufficiently salient that legislators would have considered the matter in their
deliberations.
While marriage laws from the Oblivious Era cannot reflect animus
towards gays and lesbians because no one would have thought of same-sex
marriage when they were adopted, the absence of animus does not
automatically insulate them from attack. If one believes, as the Obama
Administration does, that all laws employing a sexual orientation
classification are subject to heightened scrutiny, then laws from the
Oblivious Era likewise should be subject to that standard, even if legislators
were unaware of the possibility of same-sex marriage. As noted earlier, the
Obama Administration seems to have concluded that all laws classifying by
sexual orientation must be subject to heightened scrutiny, even if no
legislator at the time recognized that the proposed law contained a sexual
orientation classification.74 Under the Obama Administration’s argument, a
law from the 1960s or even the 1860s that explicitly or implicitly limits
73. It may be hard for some to believe that there was a time when people were unaware
of gay marriage. To better grasp the obliviousness of such an era, consider a law that
explicitly bans plural marriages, passed in an era where legislatures were focused solely on
polygyny and wholly unaware of the possibility of polyandry. Such a law obviously would
have effects on polyandrous marriages as people sought to enter into such marriages. Yet no
one would say that the ban on plural marriages reflected an animus towards polyandrous
marriages. We may well live in such an era, for when people think of plural marriages, the
image that arises is a single man marrying multiple women. In fact, there are polyandrous
societies, most notably Keralite society, in South India. The further idea that multiple
women might marry multiple men (polyamory) is, for many, wholly unfathomable,
something found only in the pages of science fiction.
74. See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (discussing 2012 Holder Letter).
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marriage to a man and a woman contains a sexual orientation distinction,
regardless of whether the actual legislators consciously intended as much.
As we saw in the federal context, applying the heightened, intermediate
scrutiny standard to laws from the Oblivious Era leads to an interesting
result. Such laws are obviously unconstitutional because they lack an
important justification for their discrimination against same-sex marriages.
After all, legislators or voters cannot have an important justification for a
legal classification that they were wholly unaware of when enacting the
underlying law. In other words, if one does not know that one has excluded
a class of people from some government recognition or benefit, one can
hardly have an important justification for the exclusion. Again, somewhat
ironically, ignorance of the possibility of same-sex marriage leads to the
invalidation of state laws that were passed in an era before same-sex
marriage leapt into the national consciousness, at least if heightened
scrutiny applies as the Obama Administration contends.
The Administration’s conclusion that Title 38 contains a sexual
orientation classification is suggestive of its general approach to federal
laws from the Oblivious Era. Congress passed the relevant provisions in
Title 38 in 1975 as a means of making the veterans’ laws gender-neutral.75
Paying no heed to this context, Attorney General Holder declared that “[t]he
legislative record of these provisions contains no rationale for providing
veterans’ benefits to opposite-sex spouses of veterans but not to same-sex
spouses of veterans.”76
Given its treatment of Title 38, the Administration presumably would
apply heightened scrutiny to all federal laws that draw distinctions based on
sexual orientation, regardless of the eras in which they were enacted. And
if it applied such scrutiny to all such federal laws, it also must believe that
such scrutiny properly applies to state laws that hail from the Oblivious Era.
Like Title 38, all such laws would be unconstitutional because “the
legislative record[s]” of all these laws would contain “no rationale” for not
recognizing same-sex marriages.77
In sum, the Obama Administration has to believe that heightened scrutiny
applies to all state laws that draw classifications based on sexual
orientation, whatever their vintage. Moreover, it must regard both state and
federal laws, whenever enacted, either as lacking important interests or as
insufficiently related to any important interests that might exist. Taken
together, these arguments suggest that it is inconceivable that DOMA
would be unconstitutional because it lacked an important justification or
was poorly tailored to advance those important interests, but that similar
state laws are somehow constitutional. While state anti-same-sex marriage
laws certainly differ from DOMA, those differences are constitutionally

75. See supra text accompanying notes 46–48.
76. 2012 Holder Letter, supra note 36, at 2.
77. See id.
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irrelevant. More precisely, using the logic of the Obama Administration’s
legal arguments, those differences are immaterial.
This takes us back to the President’s stated desire to leave the issue of
same-sex marriage to the states and his rejection of attempts to federalize it.
Having publicly concluded that sexual orientation classifications are subject
to heightened scrutiny and that DOMA fails to satisfy that standard, the
President cannot simultaneously conclude that states may bar or refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages. If DOMA is unconstitutional because it
violates equal protection, the same must be said of state anti-same-sex
marriage laws. The President’s arguments against DOMA federalize the
same-sex marriage question. He has hoisted himself on his own equal
protection petard.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTOR IN THE DOCK
What does this inconsistency say about the Presidency’s capacity as a
constitutional guardian? The Chief Executive must “preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution.”78 At a minimum, this duty forbids him from
violating the Constitution. Elsewhere, I have argued that this duty to avoid
violations bars the President from implementing the unconstitutional
schemes of others, even when they take the form of laws.79 If the President
believes a law is unconstitutional, he should not enforce it, much less
defend its constitutionality. Instead, a President faced with a statute that he
believes to be unconstitutional must treat it as void and ignore it. In other
words, he has a duty to disregard unconstitutional federal laws, lest he serve
as an instrument of the Constitution’s violation. In this respect, Presidents
should emulate Thomas Jefferson, who refused to enforce the Sedition Act
because he thought it unconstitutional.80 As Jefferson put it, he had no
more obligation to enforce it than he did a law requiring prostration before a
golden image.81 Going further, he argued that the Constitution forbade him
from enforcing a law that he believed was unconstitutional.82
How is the President to decide whether a federal law is unconstitutional,
and must he accept judicial opinions as the final word on such matters?
Because the Constitution never demands that he obey anyone else’s
interpretation of it, the President need not adopt judicial understandings,
tests, and formulas.83 Instead, the President may decide for himself what
the Constitution demands or permits, just as the courts may decide for
themselves. That is to say, he should act on his own constitutional
78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
79. See generally Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008).
80. See id. at 1664–69.
81. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), in 1 THE
ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 274, 275 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959).
82. Id. at 276.
83. See John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of Judicial Review,
84 VA. L. REV. 333 (1998).
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conclusions as he goes about preserving and protecting the Constitution,
including disregarding statutes he believes are unconstitutional.
President Obama’s stance towards DOMA fails this standard and instead
reflects the muddled, unsatisfactory nature of modern executive practice.
The President has split the difference in a way that ensures that the courts
will ultimately decide the constitutionality of DOMA. He no longer
defends the law’s constitutionality and in fact attacks it on that score. As
Neal Devins and I have argued, the decision to attack DOMA is not only
sensible, it is constitutionally required.84 The Constitution does not permit
the President to defend laws he regards as unconstitutional, for such
defenses are inconsistent with his duty to defend the Constitution.
Moreover, his duty to defend the Constitution obliges him to speak out
against those laws he believes are unconstitutional.
But the President’s decision to continue to enforce DOMA85 is a mistake
born of institutional incentives and a misunderstanding of the Supreme
Court’s role in the Constitution’s defense.86 To focus on the second point,
the Administration believes that the Supreme Court plays a special,
privileged role in constitutional defense, so special that the Administration
embraces the risk that the Supreme Court might rule DOMA
constitutional.87 The Constitution never says as much; it instead singles out
the President as a constitutional defender.88 In any event, given the
President’s stated policy of enforcing DOMA, he obviously will continue to
enforce it should the Court eventually uphold it. Again, this is not
defending the Constitution as much as participating in and furthering a
continuing assault upon it.
The President’s ill-advised DOMA enforcement policy is compounded
by his mistaken constitutional apathy towards state anti-same-sex marriage
laws. The President’s oath does not merely require that he not perpetrate or
participate in constitutional wrongs. It goes further, obliging him to defend
it against the attacks of others—the duty is to preserve, protect, and defend,
without any limitation on the class of assailants, foreign or domestic.89
One set of potential constitutional aggressors sits in the chambers of state
legislatures. No less than White House staff, and members of Congress,
state legislators may breach the Constitution. For instance, they may pass
ex post facto laws or enact measures inconsistent with republican
government. Or they may deny due process of law, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

84. See generally Saikrishna Prakash & Neal Devins, The Indefensible Duty to Defend,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 507 (2012).
85. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4 (discussing the role of the Supreme Court).
86. See generally Prakash & Devins, supra note 84.
87. See 2011 Holder Letter, supra note 4 (declaring the judiciary the “final arbiter” of
constitutional claims).
88. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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In the case of state laws, presidential disregard will accomplish nothing
because state executives enforce such laws. If the President is to satisfy his
oath with respect to state legal infringements, more than passivity is
necessary. When confronted with aggressions against the Constitution from
state legislators in the form of state laws, the President, at a minimum,
should denounce those laws as unconstitutional.90 He or his administration
ought to speak out against state laws that deny due process or abridge the
obligations of contracts.
At least, he ought to do this when he is aware of such violations and has
time to speak out in the midst of his numerous other responsibilities.
Although the Constitution requires the President to serve as its protector, it
imposes other high obligations on him. He must faithfully execute those
federal laws that are constitutional, meaning that he cannot simply focus on
whether a law is constitutional. He also must faithfully execute the office
of the President and hence must steward foreign relations, superintend the
military, defend the nation, decide which laws to veto on policy grounds,
and propose new laws. Because the President has so many duties and
functions, he cannot obsess, in the manner of a constitutional law professor,
on the Constitution.91 The existence of many other duties and the need to
allocate limited resources means that the President (and his administration)
will be unable to mount a perfect defense of the Constitution.
Because Presidents are quite busy, fulfilling a number of duties and
exercising a number of discretionary powers, a President’s failure to
comment on the constitutionality of state laws will ordinarily be quite
excusable. Yet I believe that President Obama has no excuse for his
silence. A President who has already done the heavy constitutional lifting
and concluded that federal laws discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation are unconstitutional has a constitutional duty to say something
about state laws that draw the same distinctions. His DOJ already has
penned briefs detailing why it believes heightened scrutiny is appropriate
and why DOMA is unconstitutional under such scrutiny. Each of these
briefs follows the same outline: argue at great length that sexual orientation
is a suspect class and then contend that the DOMA fails heightened
scrutiny.92 Reproducing these briefs with a few minor modifications and
filing them in federal and state courts hearing challenges to state anti-same90. In at least one instance, President Obama has actually filed suit against state laws
that he believes are unconstitutional. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
91. See Prakash, supra note 79, at 1676.
92. See, e.g., Combined Reply Brief and Response Brief for the Federal Defendants at
9–13, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 102214 (1st Cir. Dec. 1, 2011); Federal Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Notice of Cross Motion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment,
Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 4:10-CV-01564 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012);
Response of Defendants United States of America and Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Intervenor
BLAG’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment., Bishop v. United States, No. 4:04-CV00848-TCK-TLW (N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2011).
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sex marriage laws hardly entails much new work. The most difficult part
might be addressing whether the relevant state laws enjoy important
justifications. But having decided previously that certain justifications are
unimportant, that analysis should not be too arduous.
At a minimum, the Administration should declare that state-based sexual
orientation classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny, perhaps saying
nothing about how that test should apply to particular state laws. This
would involve, at most, a few hours work for Justice Department lawyers
because they have already made all these arguments. As noted earlier,
when it comes to equal protection, judicial doctrine generally makes no
distinctions between federal and state laws.93 Indeed, the cases cited in
government DOMA briefs about heightened scrutiny are typically federal
cases applying the equal protection standard to state laws, most prominently
United States v. Virginia.94
The failure to file any such brief in the myriad challenges to state laws
that prohibit same-sex marriage or that discriminate against such marriages
could reflect a “go-slow” legal strategy designed to vindicate the
constitutional right in increments. The fear is that the courts might not see
eye-to-eye with a broader reading of equal protection that the executive
branch might sketch. In other words, a go-slow approach might be
defensible if the President believed that the strategy would lead the courts
to ultimately agree with him that state anti-same-sex marriage laws are
subject to heightened scrutiny and therefore unconstitutional. Consider this
a somewhat counterintuitive but plausible argument for passivity in
executive branch constitutional defense.95
But in the context of the world as it exists today, there is no sound case
for executive passivity. Courts currently are judging the constitutionality of
state laws that discriminate against same-sex marriages. They will decide
these cases, with or without the benefit of the executive branch’s
constitutional wisdom. In this context, the go-slow strategy makes no sense
because the horse is already out of the barn, so to speak. The executive
must weigh in, lest the courts reject its sense of the Constitution. At least, it
must do so if it supposes that arguments matter and that its good arguments
may sway the courts.
Given that courts will decide the matter whether or not the executive is
passive, the executive branch’s silence in challenges to state anti-same-sex
marriage laws likely has little to do with any sort of legal strategy. Instead,
it almost certainly reflects a political calculation. In an election year, the
President likely does not want to declare that all state laws barring same-sex
marriage or discriminating against such marriages are unconstitutional
93. See supra note 5.
94. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
95. For a discussion of passivity in the context of the judicial branch, see generally
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
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infringements of the Equal Protection Clause. It also seems quite likely that
the President, for political reasons, wishes to avoid taking the more limited
step of declaring that heightened scrutiny applies to state laws that contain
sexual orientation classifications. Doing so would come too close to saying
that such laws are unconstitutional.
If election year politics explains why the Obama Administration has
refused to declare whether state laws constraining or forbidding same-sex
marriage are unconstitutional, then we have a case of the President acting
sincerely in one context and insincerely in another. Such behavior gives
credence to those who would deny the President any right to act upon his
constitutional beliefs out of a fear that the executive would come to
dominate constitutional interpretation and execute this undertaking
unfaithfully. In other words, some might fret that in a world where the
President is a significant constitutional interpreter, constitutional law will
become unprincipled.
This concern has some merit. If Presidents raise constitutional arguments
only when it suits their political agenda and ignore such concerns when
doing so would be politically inexpedient, perhaps Presidents ought to be
denied a role in constitutional defense. Maybe Presidents should do no
more than is typically done now (i.e., veto and pardon based on their own
constitutional readings). Going further, maybe they ought to be barred from
even playing that limited constitutional role.
Yet even as this concern has merit, it is also rather overblown. To begin
with, the concern about presidential suitability in constitutional
interpretation must necessarily be a comparative one. That is to say, we
must not only compare the courts with the President and consider which is a
better constitutional defender; we also must ask whether the system as a
whole is superior if both defend the Constitution simultaneously, in their
own ways. Thus framed, the presidency’s vigorous participation in
constitutional interpretation and defense fares better.
To begin with, all federal institutions look bad when considered in
isolation, because it is easy to recall episodes where each has fared poorly.
Consider the heroes of the modern era: the courts. Judges are not above
acting on the basis of political reasons; they have done so many times, with
cases like Marbury and Dred Scott serving as notorious examples. Other
times, judicial decisions are not so much political as they are driven by
considerations of sound policy, on the theory that the Constitution permits
invocation of policy concerns in constitutional interpretation. Given that
judges are not immune from the temptation to leaven judicial interpretation
with policy preferences, politics, and personal morality, it would be wrong
to harshly judge Presidents who might trim here and there when applying
their constitutional views. In any event, we must recognize that
inconsistency and partiality are inevitable features of human institutions and
hence there will never be a perfect constitutional defender.
Moreover, we have reason to suspect that Presidents who only dabble in
constitutional interpretation and defense are less likely to fully embrace
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those roles and fulfill them faithfully. Perhaps if Presidents more routinely
declined to enforce laws that they believed were unconstitutional, they also
would consider what their arguments meant for identical or similar state
laws and then say something about those laws. In other words, a more
thorough internalization of the constitutional protector model may
eventually generate more consistency and coherence on the part of
Presidents and their administrations.
Finally, we should be wary of assuming that what President Obama has
done here reflects what Presidents have done more generally. We have
very few samples of presidential defenses of the Constitution, most of
which have not been studied that well. For a better sense of how Presidents
would fare under a more robust system of constitutional defense, we need
far more episodes of presidential intervention and more attention lavished
upon them. We also need to know more about the President’s sense of the
Constitution and whether that sense is being applied consistently across
state and federal law. Whether those episodes come, whether the
President’s constitutional vision becomes more readily accessible or
perceptible, or whether the presidency remains a relatively passive
constitutional defender is unknown. Stay tuned to see if we get more
aggressive defenses of the President’s reading of the Constitution. Only
then will we have a more informed sense of whether the presidency is a
systematically insincere or opportunistic defender of the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Incrementalism and federalism are good things. But both must give way
when constitutional rights are at stake. If DOMA is subject to intermediate
scrutiny, then that same analysis necessarily applies to state laws that also
contain sexual orientation classifications. Moreover, if morality and
defending traditional marriage are unimportant governmental interests in
the context of DOMA, the same conclusions must be true when such
interests are cited in defenses of state anti-same-sex marriage laws. Finally,
if one believes that DOMA’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriages does
not substantially advance any important interest, one almost certainly has to
believe that state laws that bar same-sex marriages likewise do little to
advance important interests.
In her interview with the President, Robin Roberts seemed to sense as
much. Perhaps that is one reason why she pressed the President on the
question of states and same-sex marriage. The President evaded the
seeming inconsistency, as all smart interviewees do. But his dodging will
not last forever. There will be a time when the missing links in the
President’s evolution will be found. At some point, almost certainly after
the 2012 presidential election, Barack Obama will declare that he believes
states must recognize and permit same-sex marriages, at least as long as
they recognize and permit opposite-sex marriages. If he declares as much
as President, the former constitutional law professor will then order the
DOJ to file briefs laying out the argument—briefs that will look rather
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similar to the ones DOJ lawyers are filing today in DOMA cases. If he
loses the election, our retired President will speak out against what he
perceives to be a constitutional violation. Either way, evolution is coming,
as it always does.

